Foreign Policy.
The U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan ended last week. You'd
be forgiven if you didn't notice. There was no proclamation of success from the
White House, no fanfare at the Pentagon, no public expression of gratitude from
Afghan President Hamid Karzai. It fell to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who
was traveling in New Zealand, to announce that the last of the 33,000 surge
troops, dispatched by President Obama in late 2009 at the behest of his
military commanders, had left Afghanistan.
In stating that U.S. troop levels had dropped to 68,000,
Panetta told reporters traveling with him that "this is an
opportunity to recognize that the surge did accomplish its objectives." A few
days earlier, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, stated
that the surge was "an effort that was worth the cost."
Are they right? In my new book, Little America: The War Within the War
for Afghanistan, I explore what really happened over there -- and in
Washington -- after Obama decided to surge. The real story of the surge cannot
be reduced down to a soundbite. It exacted a significant cost on the United
States -- in lives, limbs, and dollars. Sure, the surge did have some positive
impacts: The Taliban were pushed out of large stretches of southern
Afghanistan, the influx of U.S. resources accelerated the development of the
Afghan security forces, and the billions that were poured into the country in
the name of reconstruction did provide short-term employment to thousands of
young men. But did the surge really achieve its objectives? And were the gains
worth the cost?
